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ABSTRACT
Billions of users rely on the security of the Android platform to
protect phones, tablets, and many different types of consumer elec-
tronics. While Android’s permission model is well studied, the
enforcement of the protection policy has received relatively little at-
tention. Much of this enforcement is spread across system services,
taking the form of hard-coded checks within their implementations.
In this paper, we propose Authorization Check Miner (ACMiner),
a framework for evaluating the correctness of Android’s access
control enforcement through consistency analysis of authorization
checks. ACMiner combines program and text analysis techniques to
generate a rich set of authorization checks, mines the corresponding
protection policy for each service entry point, and uses association
rule mining at a service granularity to identify inconsistencies that
may correspond to vulnerabilities. We used ACMiner to study the
AOSP version of Android 7.1.1 to identify 28 vulnerabilities relat-
ing to missing authorization checks. In doing so, we demonstrate
ACMiner’s ability to help domain experts process thousands of
authorization checks scattered across millions of lines of code.
1 INTRODUCTION
Android has become the world’s dominant computing platform,
powering over 2 billion devices by mid-2017 [11]. Not only is An-
droid the primary computing platform for many end-users, it also
has significant use by business enterprises [34] and government
agencies [35, 38]. As a result, any security flaw in the Android plat-
form is likely to cause significant and widespread damage, lending
immense importance to evaluating the platform’s security.
While Android is built on Linux, it has many differences. A key
appeal of the platform is its semantically rich application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) that provide application developers simple
and convenient abstractions to access information and resources
(e.g., retrieve the GPS location, record audio using the microphone,
and take a picture with the camera). This functionality, along with
corresponding security checks, is implemented within a collec-
tion of privileged userspace services. While most Android secu-
rity research has focused on third party applications [7, 14, 16, 19,
20, 36, 37, 40], the several efforts that consider platform security
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highlight the need for more systematic evaluation of security and
access control checks within privileged userspace services (e.g.,
evidence of system apps re-exposing information without security
checks [25, 44], or missing checks in the Package Manager service
leading to Pile-Up vulnerabilities [45]).
To date, only two prior works have attempted to evaluate the
correctness of access control logic within Android’s system ser-
vices. Both Kratos [39] and AceDroid [2] approximate correctness
through consistency measures, as previously done for evaluating
correctness of security hooks in the Linux kernel [13, 30, 42]. How-
ever, these prior works have limitations. Kratos only considers a
small number of manually-defined authorization checks (e.g., it
excludes App Ops checks). AceDroid considers a larger set of au-
thorization checks, but these are still largely manually defined,
primarily through observation. Kratos performs coarse-grained
analysis using call-graphs, leading to imprecision. AceDroid’s pro-
gram analysis provides better precision, but oversimplifies its access
control representation, making it difficult to identify vulnerabilities
within single system images.
In this paper, we propose Authorization Check Miner (ACMiner),
a framework for evaluating the correctness of Android’s access
control enforcement through consistency analysis of authoriza-
tion checks. ACMiner is based on several novel insights. First, we
avoid identification of protected operations (a key challenge in the
space) by considering program logic between service entry points
and code that throws a SecurityException. Second, we propose a
semi-automated method of discovering authorization checks. More
specifically, we mine all constants and names of methods and vari-
ables that influence conditional logic leading to throwing a Securit-
yException. From this dataset, we identify security-relevant values
(e.g., “restricted”) and develop regular expressions to automatically
identify those conditions during program analysis that mines policy
rules from the code. Third, we use association rule mining to iden-
tify inconsistent authorization checks for entry points in the same
service. Association rule mining has the added benefit of suggest-
ing changes to make authorization checks more consistent, which
is valuable when triaging results. By applying this methodology,
ACMiner allows a domain expert (i.e., a developer familiar with
the AOSP source code) to quickly identify missing authorization
checks that allow abuse by third-party applications.
We evaluated the utility of ACMiner by applying it to the AOSP
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code for Android 7.1.1. Of the 4,004 total entry points to system
services, ACMiner identified 1,995 with authorization checks. Of
these entry points, the association rule mining identified inconsis-
tencies in 246. We manually investigated these 246 entry points
with the aid of the rules suggested by the association rule mining,
which allowed us to identify 28 security vulnerabilities. ACMiner
not only reduced the effort required to analyze system services (i.e.,
by narrowing down to only 246 entry points out of 4004), but also
allowed us to rapidly triage results by suggesting solutions. Out of
the 28 security vulnerabilities, 7 were in security-sensitive entry
points that may be exploited from third-party applications, and an
additional 12 were in security-sensitive entry points that may be
exploited from system applications. The rest were in entry points
with relatively low security value. All 28 vulnerabilities have been
reported to Google. At the time of writing, Google has confirmed 2
of these vulnerabilities as “moderate severity.”
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We design and implement ACMiner, a framework that enables
a domain expert to identify and systematically evaluate incon-
sistent access control enforcement in Android’s system services.
Our results show that this analysis is not only useful for
identifying existing vulnerabilities, but also inconsistencies
that may lead to vulnerabilities in the future.
• We combine program and text analysis techniques to generate
a rich set of authorization checks used in system services. This
technique is a significant improvement over prior approaches
that use manually-defined authorization checks.
• We use ACMiner to evaluate the AOSP version of Android
7.1.1 and identify 28 vulnerabilities. All vulnerabilities have
been reported to Google, which at the time of writing has
classified 2 as “moderate severity.”
We designed ACMiner to give security researchers and system
developers deep insights into the security of Android’s system
services. This paper describes how ACMiner can systematically
analyze the consistency of the authorization checks in the system
services. However, ACMiner may also be useful for other forms
of analysis. For instance, ACMiner can aid regression testing, as it
can be extended to highlight changes to the policy implementation
on a semantic level. The information extracted by ACMiner can
also be used to study the evolution of access control in Android,
potentially discovering new vulnerabilities. Finally, since changes
by OEMs have historically introduced vulnerabilities, OEMs can
use ACMiner to validate their implemented checks against AOSP.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides background. Section 3 describes the challenges and provides
an overview of ACMiner. Section 4 describes the design of AC-
Miner in detail. Sections 5 and 6 describe our analysis of the system
services of AOSP 7.1.1. Section 7 describes the limitations of our
approach. Section 8 discusses related work. Section 9 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The Android middleware is implemented using the same compo-
nent abstractions as third-party applications [17]: activities, content
providers, broadcast receivers, and services. In this paper, we only
consider service components, which provide daemon-like func-
tionality. Apps interface with service components via the Binder
1 // Entry point with correct authorization checks
2 boolean hasBaseUserRestriction(String key , int userId) {
3 checkManageUsersPermission("hasBaseUserRestriction");
4 // Unique check without a SecurityException
5 if (! UserRestrictionsUtils.isValidRestriction(key))
6 return false;
7 ...}
8
9 // Entry point missing checkManageUsersPermission
10 boolean hasUserRestriction(String key , int userId) {
11 if (! UserRestrictionsUtils.isValidRestriction(key))
12 return false;
13 ...}
14
15 void checkManageUsersPermission(String message) {
16 if (! hasManageUsersPermission ())
17 throw new SecurityException ();}
18
19 boolean hasManageUsersPermission () {
20 int callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid ();
21 return UserHandle.isSameApp(callingUid ,
22 Process.SYSTEM_UID)
23 || callingUid == Process.ROOT_UID
24 || ActivityManager.checkComponentPermission(
25 "android.permission.MANAGE_USERS",
26 callingUid , -1, true) ==
27 PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED ;}
Figure 1: Vulnerability found in UserManagerService by our tool
inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism, which consists of
sending parcel objects that indicate the target interface method
being called via an integer. For the most part, Android’s system
services use the Android Interface Description Language (AIDL) to
automatically generate the code that unmarshalles these parcels.
Moreover, when interfacing with system services, third party apps
rely on public APIs implementing a proxy to construct the parcel.
When the parcel is unmarshalled by the service interface, the ar-
guments are passed to a stub that calls the corresponding entry
point method in the service component. While not all service entry
points have corresponding public APIs, any third-party application
can use reflection to invoke the entry points for “hidden” APIs.
Android uses two broad techniques to enforce access control.
For coarse-grained checks (i.e., at the component level), the Ac-
tivity Manager Service (AMS) enforces policy specified in appli-
cation manifest files. This paper focuses on fine-grained checks
(i.e., at the service entry point level), which are enforced using
hard-coded logic within the service implementation. This hard-
coded logic includes variants of the checkPermission method, Unix
Identifier (UID) checks, as well as many subtle checks based on
service-specific state. Prior work [2, 39] has primarily relied on
manual enumeration of these checks, which is error prone. To sim-
plify discussion in this paper, we refer to such methods that return
or check Android system state as context queries.
Figure 1 provides a motivating example for this paper, which
contains a vulnerability discovered by ACMiner. The simplified
code snippet is from the User Manager Service, which provides core
functionality similar to the Activity Manager and Package Manager
Services. In the figure, there are two entry points: hasBaseUserRes-
triction and hasUserRestriction. The entry points perform very
similar functionality, but have inconsistent authorization checks.
Specifically, hasBaseUserRestriction throws a SecurityException
if the caller does not have the proper UID or permission.
This example is particularly apropos to ACMiner, because hasU-
serRestriction does not call any of the context queries considered
2
(1) Program analysis using 
security exceptions, known checks
(2) Expert review and 
text analytics
 (3) Association 
rule mining
All API Calls and code
Potential Authorization checks
Actual authorization checks
Inconsistent 
APIs
Volume of information 
needing expert attention
Figure 2: Overview of ACMiner. At each stage, ACMiner signifi-
cantly reduces the information an expert needs to analyze.
by prior work [2, 39]. It also does not throw a SecurityException.
Without knowledge that isValidRestriction is an authorization
check, no form of consistency analysis could have identified that
hasUserRestriction has a missing check.
3 OVERVIEW
The goal of this paper is to help a domain expert quickly identify
and assess the impact of incorrect access control logic in imple-
mentations of system services in Android. As with most nontrivial
software systems, no ground truth specification of correctness ex-
ists. Rather, the “ground truth” resides largely within the heads of
the platform developers. Prior literature has approached this type
of problem by approximating correctness with consistency. The
intuition is that system developers are not malicious and that they
are likely to get most of the checks correct. The approach was first
applied to security hook placement in the Linux kernel [13, 30, 42]
and more recently the Android platform [2, 39].
Evaluating authorization check correctness via consistency anal-
ysis requires addressing the following challenges.
• Protected Operations: Nontrivial systems rarely have a clear
specification of the functional operations that require pro-
tection by the access control system. Protected operations
range from accessing a device node to reading a value from a
private member variable. Axplorer [6] attempts to enumerate
protected operations for Android; however, the specification
is far from complete.
• Authorization Checks: What constitutes an authorization
check is vague and imprecise. While some authorization
checks are clear (e.g., those based on checkPermission and
getCallingUid), many others are based on service-specific
state and the corresponding authorization checks use a vari-
ety of method and variable names.
• Consistency: The granularity and type of consistency impacts
the precision and utility of the analysis. While increasing the
scope of relevant authorization checks increases the noise in
the analysis, not considering all authorization checks (as in
Kratos [39]) or using heuristics to determine relevancy (as in
AceDroid [2]) raises the risk of not detecting vulnerabilities.
ACMiner addresses these challenges through several novel in-
sights. First, ACMiner avoids the need to specify protected opera-
tions by considering program logic between service entry points
and code that throws a SecurityException. Our intuition is that if
one control flow path leads to a SecurityException, an alternate
control flow path leads to a protected operation. Furthermore, the
conditional logic leading to the SecurityException describes the
authorization checks. However, we found that not all authoriza-
tion denials lead to a SecurityException, therefore, we also include
entry points that contain known authorization checks. Second,
ACMiner semi-automatically discovers new authorization checks
using a combination of static program analysis and textual pro-
cessing. More specifically, ACMiner identifies all of the method
names, variable names, and strings that influence the conditional
logic leading to a SecurityException. The security-relevant values
are manually refined and used to generate regular expressions that
identify a broader set of authorization checks within service im-
plementations. Third and finally, ACMiner uses association rule
mining for consistency analysis. For each entry point, ACMiner
uses static program analysis to extract a set of authorization checks.
Association rule mining compares the authorization check sets
between entry points in the same service. The analysis produces
suggestions (called “rules”) of how the sets should change to make
them more consistent. These rules include confidence scores that
greatly aid domain experts when triaging the results. This general
approach is depicted in Figure 2.
To more concretely understand how ACMiner operates, consider
the discovery of the vulnerability shown in Figure 1. As a pre-
processing step, ACMiner helps a domain expert semi-automatically
identify authorization checks. First, ACMiner determines that the
return value of isValidRestriction controls flow from the entry
point hasBaseUserRestriction to a SecurityException. As such, this
method name, along with many security irrelevant names are given
to a domain expert. The domain expert then identifies security
relevant terms (e.g. “restriction“), which ACMiner consumes as
part of a regular expression. Next, ACMiner mines the policy of
the User Manager Service, extracting a policy for both hasBaseU-
serRestriction and hasUserRestriction, with the policy for hasU-
serRestriction only being extracted because isValidRestriction
was identified as an authorization check. For each entry point, the
policy is then encoded as a set of authorization checks (e.g. isVali-
dRestriction and ROOT_UID == getCallingUid()). Finally, ACMiner
performs association rule mining to suggest set changes that make
the policy more consistent. Such suggestions led us to discover the
vulnerability in hasUserRestriction.
4 DESIGN
ACMiner is constructed on top of the Java static analysis framework
Soot [31, 43] and has been largely parallelized so as to improve
the run time of the complex analysis of Android’s services. The
design of ACMiner can be divided into three phases: (§4.1) Mining
Authorization Checks, (§4.2) Refining Authorization Checks, and
(§4.3) Inconsistency Analysis.
4.1 Mining Authorization Checks
The first phase of ACMiner is mining authorization checks. This
phase consist of the following program analysis challenges: (§4.1.1)
Call Graph Construction, (§4.1.2) Identifying Authorization-Check
Statements, and (§4.1.3) Representing Authorization Checks.
4.1.1 Call Graph Construction. Authorization checks are mined
by traversing a call graph of the service implementation. ACMiner
constructs call graphs using the following three steps.
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Figure 3: ACMiner’s processing stages and input files.
Extracting Java Class Files: ACMiner extracts a .jar containing
all the class files of the Android middleware in Soot’s Jimple format
from Android’s system.img. This .jar containing Jimple files is then
used on all subsequent runs of ACMiner. The implementation of
this approach is detailed in Appendix A.
Extracting System Services and Entry Points: Android’s mid-
dleware is composed of isolated services that communicate through
predefined Binder boundaries. This division allows ACMiner to an-
alyze each service separately, by defining each service by the code
reachable through its Binder entry points. ACMiner extracts system
services and their entry points similar to prior work [2, 5, 39]. For
implementation details, please see Appendix B.
Reducing the Call Graph:ACMiner constructs a call graph repre-
senting all possible transitive calls from the entry points. ACMiner
uses the Class Hierarchy Analysis (CHA) [12], which is guaranteed
to provide an over-approximation of the actual runtime call graph.
In contrast, Kratos and AceDroid use other potentially more accu-
rate call graph builders (i.e., SPARK [33] and its WALA equivalent),
which use points-to analysis to construct a less complete under-
approximation of the runtime call graph. The loss of completeness
occurs when constructing call graphs for libraries and other Java
code without main methods. Therefore, it is important to note that
unlike the prior work, ACMiner is more complete and guaranteed
to include all paths containing authorization checks.
Since CHA call graphs are coarse over-approximations of the
runtime call graph, ACMiner must apply heuristics to mitigate
call graph bloat. When resolving targets for method invocations,
CHA considers every possible implementation of the target method
whose declaring type is within the type hierarchy of the call’s
receiver type. If the invoked method is defined in a widely used
interface or superclass, the resolution may identify hundreds of tar-
gets for a single invocation. Thus, the resulting CHA call graph for
the Android middleware is too large to be analyzed in a reasonable
amount of time and memory [32].
To mitigate call graph bloat, we manually defined a list of classes
and methods to exclude from the analysis, which become cutoff
points in the call graph. We ensured that the class or method subject
to exclusion did not contain, lead to, or was used in an authoriza-
tion check. While the exclude list may require revision for newer
versions of AOSP or modifications made by vendors, the creation
of the exclude list is a largely one-time effort. Please see Appen-
dix C for a detailed description of the exclusion procedure and our
website [1] for a full list of excluded classes/methods.
Finally, when analyzing an entry point, ACMiner treats all other
entry points as cutoff points in the call graph. This decision further
reduces call graph bloat. Unfortunately, it also introduces unsound-
ness into the call graph, which we discuss in Section 7.
4.1.2 Identifying Authorization Check Statements. Once ACMiner
has the call graph for all entry points, the next step is to identify
authorization checks. As described in Section 2, the complete set of
authorization checks is unknown. ACMiner takes a two pronged
approach to identifying authorization checks. First, it identifies
all possible checks leading to a protected operation (this section).
Second, it refines the list of possible authorization checks based on
code names and string values (Section 4.2). To describe this process,
we must first define a control predicate.
Definition 1 (Control Predicate). A conditional statement (i.e., an
if or switch statement) whose logic authorizes access to some
protected operation.
Identifying protected operations is nontrivial, as they may range
from accessing a device node to returning a privatemember variable.
However, even if we knew the protected operations, we would still
need to determine which conditional statements are control predi-
cates. ACMiner uses the key observation that Android frequently
throws a SecurityException when access is denied. Therefore, AC-
Miner marks all conditional statements on the control flow path
between entry points and the statement throwing the SecurityExc-
eption as potential control predicates.
While throwing a SecurityException is the most common way
Android denies access, it is not the only way. Some entry points
deny access by returning false or even by returning empty data.
Such denials are not easily identifiable. Fortunately, as shown in
Figure 1, Android often groups authorization checks into methods
to simplify placement. We refer to such groups of authorization
checks as context queries.
Definition 2 (Context Query). A method consisting entirely of a
set of control predicates, calls to other context queries, and/or whose
return value is frequently used as part of a control predicate.
By identifying context queries, ACMiner can mark control pred-
icates not on the path between a entry point and a thrown Sec-
urityException, thereby making the authorization check mining
more complete. As shown in Figure 3, ACMiner is configured with
a input file that specifies context queries. Our method for defining
this input is described in Section 4.2.
Using these insights, ACMiner identifies authorization checks
with fairly high accuracy. The identification procedure is as follows.
First, ACMiner marks all conditional statements inside a context
query and the subsequent transitive callees as control predicates
for the entry point. Next, ACMiner performs a backwards inter-
procedural control flow analysis from each statement throwing a
SecurityException and each context query invocation to the entry
point. During this backwards analysis, ACMiner marks all condi-
tional statements on the path as potential control predicates. Finally,
to capture control predicates that occur without a SecurityExcept-
ion, ACMiner performs a forward inter-procedural def-use analysis
on the return value of a context query. During this analysis, AC-
Miner marks any conditional statement that uses the return value
as a potential control predicate. Note, ACMiner does not currently
track the return value through fields, as this was found to be too
noisy. However, ACMiner can track the return value through vari-
able assignments, arithmetic operations, array assignments, and
the passed parameters of a method invoke.
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4.1.3 Representing Authorization Checks. ACMiner represents the
authorization checks for each entry point as a set of context queries
and control predicates.We initially represented authorization checks
as boolean expressions representing the control flow decisions that
lead to a thrown SecurityException or invoked context query. This
representation would allow ACMiner to verify the existence, order,
and the comparison operators of the authorization checks. However,
for complex services (e.g., the Activity Manager) this representation
was infeasible due to the large number of authorization checks. Ad-
ditionally, we found that without more complex context-sensitive
analysis, ACMiner could not extract authorization checks involving
implicit flows. Therefore, we simplified our consistency analysis to
only consider the existence of an authorization check for an entry
point. This approach requires two reasonable correctness assump-
tions: (1) all authorization checks have been placed and ordered
correctly, and (2) all control predicates have the correct comparison
operator. ACMiner cannot detect violations of these assumptions.
The existence of authorization checks is easily represented as a
set; however some processing is required. For each variable in a au-
thorization check statement, ACMiner must substitute all possible
values for that variable. More specifically, for each control pred-
icates and context queries statement (i.e., conditional or method
invoke statement), ACMiner must generate a list containing the
product of all the possible variables and the values for each variable.
To reduce redundant output, ACMiner only computes the product
for context queries that do not have a return value or whose return
value is not used in a control predicates.
For this expansion, ACMiner applies an inter-procedural def-use
analysis to each variable used in a statement, thereby obtaining
the set of all possible values for that variable from the entry point
to this specific use site. It then computes the product of these sets
to achieve the complete set of authorization checks for a single
statement. If a variable is assigned a value from the return of a
method call, ACMiner does not consider the possible return values
of the method, but instead includes a reference to all the possible
targets of the method call. Similarly, if a variable is assigned a
value from the field of a class or an array, ACMiner includes only a
reference to the field or array instead of all the possible values that
may be assigned to the field or array. As such, while the list of values
largely consists of constants, it may also contain references to fields,
methods and arrays. The resulting combination of all the iterations
of values for each control predicate and each required context query
of an entry point makes up the final set of authorization checks
output by ACMiner.
The resulting set has the potential to be exponentially large.
To prevent this growth and to remove noise in ACMiner’s output,
we apply several simplifications to the authorization checks (see
Appendix D). These simplifications are designed to increase the
number of authorization checks that are equivalent from a security
standpoint and in no way affect the completeness of the authoriza-
tion checks.
4.2 Refining Authorization Checks
The techniques in Section 4.1.2 identify potential control predicates;
however, not all conditional statements are authorization checks.
Performing consistency analysis at this point would be infeasible
Table 1: Initial List of Context Queries
Classes Methods
Context
ContextImpl
ContextWrapper
enforcePermission
enforceCallingPermission
enforceCallingOrSelfPermission
checkPermission
checkCallingPermission
checkCallingOrSelfPermission
AccountManagerService checkBinderPermission
LocationManagerService checkPackageName
IActivityManager
ActivityManagerProxy
ActivityManagerService
checkPermission
ActivityManagerService
ActivityManager
checkComponentPermission
checkUidPermission
IPackageManager
IPackageManager$Stub$Proxy
PackageManagerService
checkUidPermission
checkPermission
due to the excessive noise in the data. Therefore, ACMiner uses a
one-time, semi-automated method to significantly reduce noise.
Our key observation is that Section 4.1 over approximates au-
thorization checks on the path from entry points to a thrown Se-
curityException or context query. From this over-approximation,
ACMiner can generate a list of all the strings and fields used in the
conditional statements, a list of the methods whose return values
are used in the conditional statements, and the methods containing
the conditional statements. These values can be manually classified
as authorization-related or not. The general refinement procedure
is as follows: (1) a domain expert filters out values not related
to authorization; (2) the refined list is translated into generalized
expressions; (3) ACMiner uses the generalized expressions to au-
tomatically filter out values not related to authorization; (4) the
generalized expressions are refined until the automatically gener-
ated list is close to that defined by the domain expert.While creating
generalized expressions is time consuming, they can be used to
analyze multiple Android builds with minimal modifications.
The specific refinement procedure is divided into two phases:
(§4.2.1) identifying additional context queries, and (§4.2.2) refining
control predicate identification.
4.2.1 Identifying Additional Context Queries. ACMiner uses con-
text queries as indicators of the existence of authorization checks
when no SecurityException is thrown. Our initial list of context
queries, shown in Table 1, was very limited and only contained 33
methods. To expand this list we performed the following steps: (1)
run ACMiner as described in Section 4.1 using the initial list of
context queries, (2) from the marked conditional statements, gener-
ate a list of the methods containing these conditional statements
and the methods whose return values are used in these conditional
statements, (3) have a domain expert inspect the list and identify
methods that match our definition of a context query, and add these
to our list of context queries, and (4) repeat steps 1→3 until no new
context queries are added to the list. For Android AOSP 7.1.1, this
procedure took about 48 hours and increased the number of context
queries to 620 methods.
To make this list reusable, we translate it into a set of generalized
expressions that describe context queries across different Android
versions. The expressions consist of regular expressions and string
matches for the package, class, and name of a method, and also
include conditional logic. An example expression is shown in Fig-
ure 4. Overall, we defined 49 generalized expressions to describe
context queries for Android AOSP 7.1.1, which took <10 hours. The
expressions enabled ACMiner to identify an additional 255 methods,
5
(and (or (starts-with-package android.)
(starts-with-package com.android. ))
(regex-name-words `^( enforce|has|check)\s
([a-z\s]+\s)? permission(s)?\b`)
(not (equal-package android.test ))...))
Figure 4: Example expressions to describe context queries.
resulting in a total of 875 context queries. Please see Appendix E
for details on the translation procedure and our website [1] for the
expression-list.
4.2.2 Refining Control Predicate Identification. To refine the over-
approximation of authorization checks, ACMiner again uses a semi-
automated method of refinement, this time for control predicates.
The process begins by running ACMiner with the refined context
queries from Section 4.2.1. The expert then inspects lists of strings,
fields, and methods for the potential control predicates, removing
those not related to authorization.
From our exploration, we discovered a number of different cate-
gories of control predicates. Some we were aware of such as those
involving UID, PID, GID, UserId, AppId, and package name. However,
even within these categories, we discovered new fields, methods,
and contexts in which checks are performed.We also discovered pre-
viously unknown categories of control predicates including those:
(1) involving SystemProperties, (2) involving flags, (3) performing
permission checks using the string equals method instead of the
standard check permission methods, (4) checking for specific intent
strings, and (5) checking boolean fields in specific classes. Finally,
we discovered that a significant amount of noise was generated by
the conditional statements of loops and sanity checks such as null
checks. Using all of the information gained from the exploration of
elements related to possible control predicates, we defined a filter
that refines control predicate and reduces the overall noise.
Overall, the exploration took about 56 hours. We defined a 41-
rule filter in about 16 hours (see our website [1] for the actual filter
and Appendix F for the specification process). The application of the
filter for Android AOSP 7.1.1 reduced what ACMiner considered
to be control predicates from 25808 to 3308. Such a significant
reduction not only underscores the need for a filter but also makes
the consistency analysis (Section 4.3) more feasible.
4.3 Consistency Analysis
The final step of ACMiner is consistency analysis of authorization
checks for each entry point. In this paper, we perform consistency
analysis of all entry points within a service. However, the method-
ology may work across multiple services, or even across different
OEM firmwares. ACMiner performs consistency analysis by auto-
matically discovering underlying correlative relationships between
sets of authorization checks. Specifically, ACMiner adopts a targeted
approach for association rule mining by using constraint-based
querying. It then uses these association rules to predict whether an
entry point’s authorization checks are consistent. The results are
presented to a domain expert for review.
Figure 5a shows an example association rule generated by AC-
Miner from the code in Figure 1. X and Y are sets of authorization
checks found in entry points. The rule states that if an entry point
has check(s) from the set X , then it must also have the check(s) in
setY . ACMiner then uses these generated rules to identify potential
vulnerabilities by reporting entry points that violate the learned
isValidRestriction(String)
X
hasManageUsersPermission()
checkComponentPermission(MANAGE_USERS,
getCallingUid(), -1, true)
ROOT_UID == getCallingUid()
isSameApp(SYSTEM_UID, getCallingUid())
Y
(a) Association Rule
API X→ Y
hasBaseUserRestriction ✓
setUserRestriction ✓
hasUserRestriction X
(b) Entry Points For Rule
Figure 5: (a) shows an association rule generated from the code in
Figure 1 and (b) illustrates how the first 2 entry points satisfy the
rule, while hasUserRestriction does not, indicating it contains one
or more inconsistent authorization checks.
rules (i.e., if an entry point has all of the checks in X , but it is
missing checks inY , then a violation occurs). For instance, Figure 5b
shows the three entry points that match X for the rule in Figure 5a,
out of which hasUserRestriction fails to satisfy the rule (it does
not contain checkManageUsersPermission). On closer inspection, we
discovered that all three entry points either set or get information
about user restrictions. Moreover, the functionality of hasUserR-
estriction is nearly identical to hasBaseUserRestriction, which
suggests checkManageUsersPermission is needed. As seen in these
examples, ACMiner allows an expert to only compare entry points
that are close in terms of their authorization checks, which is more
precise than comparing all entry points to one another.
The remainder of this section discusses ACMiner’s approach to
efficiently discover these association rules and how ACMiner uses
them to detect inconsistencies in authorization checks.
4.3.1 Association Rule Mining. Association rule mining discovers
correlative relationships between sets of authorization checks, A =
{i1, i2, · · · , in }, across a set of entry points, E = {t1, t2, · · · , tm }
where each entry point in E contains a subset of the items in A. An
association rule takes the form X =⇒ Y where X (antecedent)
and Y (consequent) are sets of authorization checks and X and Y
are disjoint, i.e., X ⊆ A and Y ⊆ A and X ∩ Y = ∅.
To avoid an excessive number of association rules, ACMiner uses
two statistical constraints (support and confidence) to remove can-
didate association rules that are less than the thresholds minimum
support (minsup) and minimum confidence (minconf ). Let α(I ) rep-
resent the set of entry points in E that contain the authorization
checks I ⊆ A, i.e., α(I ) = {t ∈ E | ∀i ∈ I , i ∈ t}. The support of an
association rule X =⇒ Y is the probability that a set of autho-
rization checks Z = X ∪ Y appears in the set of transactions E, i.e.,
σ (Z ) = |α (Z ) ||E | . The confidence of an association rule is an estimate
of the conditional probability of the association rule P(Y |X ) where
X =⇒ Y and can be calculated as conf(X =⇒ Y ) = σ (X∪Y )σ (X ) .
While association rule mining has been applied to similar prob-
lems by prior work [29], the large transaction size (i.e., number
of authorization checks in an entry point) in our problem domain
makes general association rule mining algorithms infeasible due to
their exponential complexity. Therefore, ACMiner uses two main
optimizations to reduce the complexity to polynomial time.
First, ACMiner only generates a subset of the association rules
called closed association rules [41]. An association rule X =⇒ Y
is closed if X ∪ Y is a frequent closed itemset. A frequent closed
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itemset is a set of authorization checks C ⊆ A where the support
of C is greater than minsup and there does not exist a superset C ′
that has the same support as C . C is closed iff β(α(C)) = C where
β(T ) represents the largest set of common authorization checks
present in the entry pointsT whereT ⊆ E, i.e., β(T ) = {i ∈ A | ∀t ∈
T , i ∈ t}. Note that only mining frequent closed itemsets is loss-
less, because all frequent itemsets can be generated from the set
of frequent closed itemsets, as proven by Zaki and Hsiao [46]. Our
proof that closed association rules also do not result in information
loss can be found in Appendix G.
Second, ACMiner generates closed association rules in a targeted
manner by placing constraints on the authorization checks that
appear in the antecedent of the association rule. Since the goal
of consistency analysis is to predict whether an entry point’s im-
plementation of authorization checks is consistent, we are only
interested in generating association rules where the antecedent of
the association rule is a subset of the entry point’s authorization
checks (i.e., X ⊆ Aj where Aj is the authorization checks of en-
try point ej ). For example, consider Aj = {i1, i2, i3} and we have
two frequent closed itemsets {i1, i2, i3, i4} and {i5, i6, i7}. The as-
sociation rule {i1, i2, i3 =⇒ i4} is useful, as it could potentially
hint that the authorization checks in Aj is inconsistent and should
also contain i4. However, all of the association rules from the set
{i5, i6, i7} do not provide additional information on the consistency
of authorization checks in Aj , as the two sets are disjoint.
Further, assuming that the authorization checks that are present
within an entry point are correct, we can force the antecedent to
be constant. In particular, when generating association rules from
a frequent closed itemset I for an entry point Aj , we set X = Aj ∩ I
and can generate association rules by varying the items in Y . If we
reduce the authorization checks in X , then we are making the rule
less relevant to the consistency of the entry pointAj while keeping
X constant only produces the most relevant association rules.
4.3.2 Inconsistency Detection and Output Generation. ACMiner
uses the association rules discussed in Section 4.3.1 to analyze the
consistency of an entry point’s authorization checks. To minimize
the amount of manual effort required to verify the presence of
an inconsistency, we ensure the output only contains high confi-
dence rules by setting minconf to 85%. Moreover, as we want the
authorization checks in the consequent of an association rule to be
formed by at least 2 entry points, we set the minsup to 2|E | .
While generating the association rules, we mark an entry point’s
authorization checks as consistent if there exists a frequent closed
itemset that contains the exact same authorization checks as the
entry point, as this hints that the entry point’s authorization checks
are consistent with another entry point’s authorization checks. In
particular, entry point ej ’s authorization checks Aj is consistent iff
∃C ∈ A|C = Aj ∧ β(α(C)) ∧ σ (C) ≥ 2|E | . In contrast, we mark an
entry point’s authorization checks as potentially inconsistent if an
association rule exists where the entry point’s authorization checks
are the antecedent of the rule and the consequent is not empty (i.e.,
∃X =⇒ Y |X ⊆ Aj ∧ Y , ∅).
ACMiner outputs an HTML file for the domain expert to review
for each association rule representing a potentially inconsistent
entry point. The HTML file contains the set of supporting autho-
rization checks for the association rule (i.e. the antecedent), the set
of authorization checks being recommended by the association rule
(i.e. the consequent), and the 3 or more entry points that contain
the authorization checks of the association rule. This group of entry
points can be subdivided into two sets: the target entry point and
the supporting entry points. The target entry point is the entry
point the association rule has identified as being inconsistent, i.e.,
the entry point the association rule is recommending additional
authorization checks for. The supporting entry points are the 2 or
more entry points where the recommended authorization checks
occur. Note that the supporting authorization checks occur in both
the target and the supporting entry points. To aid the review, the
HTML file also contains the set of all authorization checks from the
target entry point that do not occur in the supporting authorization
checks and for all authorization checks, the method in the Android
source code where the checks occur.
To reduce the manual effort required to confirm inconsisten-
cies, we perform two post-processing techniques. First, we remove
association rules where |recommended authorization checks | >=
5 ∗ |supporting authorization checks |, since association rules that
contain 100 authorization checks which imply 500 authorization
checks is improbable. Second, we remove any remaining associa-
tion rules that have over 100 recommended authorization checks
as such association rules are unlikely to indicate inconsistencies,
and the domain expert may not be able to evaluate such rules in a
reasonable amount of time.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluated ACMiner by performing an empirical analysis of the
system services in AOSP version 7.1.1_r1 (i.e., API 25) built for a
Nexus 5X device. Our analysis was performed on a machine with
an Intel Xeon E5-2620 V3 (2.40 GHz), 128 GB RAM, running Ubuntu
14.04.1 as the host OS, OpenJDK 1.8.0_141, and Python 2.7.6.
We used ACMiner to mine the authorization checks of all the
entry points from this build of AOSP and perform consistency
analysis, as described in Section 4. Finally, we manually analyzed
the inconsistencies using a systematic methodology to identify high
risk (i.e., easily exploitable) and high impact vulnerabilities, and
developed proof-of-concept exploits to validate our findings. Our
evaluation is guided by the following research questions:
RQ1 Does ACMiner reduce the effort required by the domain expert
in terms of the entry points that need to be analyzed?
RQ2 Do the inconsistencies identified by ACMiner help a domain
expert in finding security vulnerabilities?
RQ3 What are the major causes behind inconsistencies that do not
resolve to security vulnerabilities?
RQ4 Is ACMiner more effective than prior work at detecting vulner-
abilities in system services?
RQ5 What is the time required by ACMiner to analyze all the system
services in a build of Android?
We now highlight the salient findings from our evaluation, fol-
lowed by the categorization of the discovered vulnerabilities. The
categorization of non-security inconsistencies, developed via a sys-
tematic manual analysis of our results, is described in Section 6.
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Figure 6: (a) shows how ACMiner is able to reduce the scope of the
AOSP 7.1.1 system code a domain expert needs to evaluate and (b)
breaks down the 28 vulnerabilities in terms of risk and impact.
5.1 Evaluation Highlights
As shown in Figure 6a, ACMiner reduces the total number of en-
try points that need to be manually analyzed down to just 246
entry points with inconsistent authorization checks, a 94% reduc-
tion (RQ1). As a result, ACMiner significantly enhances a domain
expert’s ability to evaluate the consistency of access control en-
forcement in the Android system by minimizing the effort required.
Further, ACMiner took approximately 1 hour and 16 minutes to
mine the authorization checks of all entry points from the sys-
tem image of the AOSP build, and spent an additional 30 minutes
producing the HTML files for the association rules that represent
potentially vulnerable entry points. While ACMiner could be opti-
mized further, time taken by ACMiner is a feasible cost, given its
scalability benefits over a fully manual analysis (RQ5).
On manually analyzing the 246 entry points, we discovered a
total of 28 entry points containing security vulnerabilities (RQ2).
As Figure 6b illustrates, these 28 vulnerabilities were then classified
in terms of their risk (i.e., the ease of exploiting a vulnerability)
as well as the impact (i.e., the gravity of the consequence of an
exploited vulnerability). Using this criteria, we found 7 vulnera-
bilities that were high risk as well as high impact, 1 vulnerability
that was high risk only, 12 vulnerabilities that were high impact
only, and 8 vulnerabilities that were low in terms of both risk and
impact. All 28 vulnerabilities have been submitted to Google. So far,
2 of our vulnerabilities have been assigned a ”moderate” Android
Security Rewards (ASR) severity level, which is generally awarded
to bypasses in access control mechanisms (e.g., restrictions on con-
strained processes, or general bypasses of privileged processes [23]).
In Section 5.2, we categorize these 28 vulnerabilities according to
their effect; however, we only discuss a few of these vulnerabilities
in depth, due to space constraints.
ACMiner is significantly more effective than prior work at iden-
tifying inconsistent authorization checks. For instance, ACMiner
is able to identify 875 unique context queries using the semi-auto-
mated approach described in Section 4.2.1, a drastic 2552% improve-
ment over the original 33 context queries that encompass a majority
of the context queries considered by Kratos [39]. Further, while Ace-
Droid [2] is more comprehensive than Kratos in its identification
of Android’s authorization checks, it relies on a manually defined
list of context queries, which is insufficient. That is, as described in
Section 4.2.1, our thorough attempts at identifying context queries
through manual observation alone resulted in the identification
of only 620 context queries, 71% of the total context queries that
ACMiner is able to find using its semi-automated approach. Thus,
while AceDroid does not provide quantitative information on its set
of context queries, we can certainly say that it is not as complete
as ACMiner in its identification of Android’s authorization checks.
Indeed, the context query isValidRestriction in Figure 1 is an ex-
ample of a context query that neither AceDroid nor Kratos was able
to identify, and in fact, one that we missed in our manual definition
of Android’s authorization checks. However, through the general
expressions, ACMiner was able to identify isValidRestriction as a
context query and the vulnerability outlined in Figure 1. Moreover,
neither AceDroid nor Kratos makes any mention of the App Ops
restrictions in their definition of Android’s authorization checks.
Yet ACMiner is able to identify 2 vulnerabilities relating to the App
Ops restrictions (see Section 5.2). While a full empirical comparison
with Kratos and AceDroid is infeasible due to the lack of source
code access, our evaluation demonstrates that ACMiner makes sig-
nificant advancements to existing work in terms of the coverage
of the authorization checks, making the consistency analysis as
complete as possible (RQ4).
Finally, ACMiner produced 453 association rules denoting in-
consistent authorization checks in 246 entry points. Some entry
points had more than one inconsistency. Furthermore, while some
inconsistencies were indeed valid security vulnerabilities (30/453),
others were a result of irregular coding practices in Android (25/453)
or indicative of ACMiner’s limitations in terms of analyzing the
semantics of the authorization checks (RQ3). The limitations identi-
fied via our analysis point to hard problems in analyzing Android’s
access control logic and motivate future work.
5.2 Findings
Table 2 describes the vulnerabilities discovered through our anal-
ysis of Android 7.1.1 with ACMiner. On manually analyzing the
inconsistent entry points produced by ACMiner, we discovered
28 entry points that represent security vulnerabilities. While most
of these entry points represent one vulnerability each, two entry
points (i.e., getLastLocation and setStayOnSetting, vulnerabilities
15 and 16 in Table 2 respectively) each led us to clusters of multiple
identically vulnerable entry points, as described later in this section.
For simplicity, we count each cluster as a single vulnerability.
We group the vulnerabilities into the following 3 categories:
(1) user separation and restrictions, (2) App Ops, (3) and pre23.
This categorization is based on the subsystems affected by the
vulnerabilities (e.g., App Ops), as well as the characteristics they
have in common (e.g., pre23). Additionally, some vulnerabilities
that are hard to classify have been categorized as (4) miscellaneous.
VC1: Multi-user Enforcement: As shown in Table 2, a majority
(i.e., 14) of the vulnerabilities affect Android’s separation among
users (i.e. user profiles in Android’s multi-user enforcement [24]).
These can be further divided into four subcategories based on how
they may be exploited: (1) leaking user information across users,
(2) operating across users, (3) modifying user settings before a user
exists, and (4) allowing users to bypass restrictions.
1. Leaking Information to Other Users: In 5 entry points (i.e.,
1→5 in Table 2), the lack of checks leads to potential leaks of
security-sensitive information to other users. For instance, using the
vulnerable entry point getInstalledApplications in the PackageM-
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Table 2: Description of vulnerabilities, along with the services in which they are present
Associated Entry Point (Service) Vulnerability Description
VC1: Multi-user Enforcement
1. getInstalledApplications (PMS) Missing the enforceCrossUserPermission check, allowing any app on one user profile to discover apps installed on other profiles.
2. getPackagesHoldingPermissions (PMS) Missing enforceCrossUserPermission, allowing any app on one user profile to get sensitive permission information about other profiles.
3. hasUserRestriction (UMS) Missing the hasManageUsersPermission check, which checks for the permission MANAGE_USERS, is missing, allowing any user to discover
the restrictions on their own and other user profiles.
4. checkUriPermission (AMS) Missing the handleIncomingUser check that verifies if a user can operate on behalf of another, allowing any user access to content provider
URIs belonging to another user, so long as the app making the request has access to the content provider.
5. grantUriPermission (AMS) Missing the handleIncomingUser check, with similar implications as checkUriPermission.
6. killPackageDependents (AMS) Missing the handleIncomingUser check, allowing any user to kill the apps and background processes of another user.
7. setUserProvisioningState (DPMS) Missing the enforceFullCrossUsersPermission check, enabling any user to change another user profile’s state.
8. setDefaultBrowserPackageName (PMS) Missing the enforceCrossUserPermission check, enabling any user to set the default browser of any other user.
9. updateLockTaskPackages (AMS) Missing handleIncomingUser, enabling any user to modify the apps that may be permanently pinned to the screen in a kiosk like venue.
10. installExistingPackageAsUser (PMS) Does not check if the target user exists, allowing any user to install apps on user profiles that may be created at a later time.
11. setApplicationHiddenSettingAsUser (PMS) Does not check if the target user exists, allowing any user to hide apps on user profiles that may be created in the future.
12. setAlwaysOnVpnPackage (CS) Does not check for the no_config_vpn user restriction, allowing a managed user to set its always on VPN to another application.
13. setWallpaperComponent (WPMS) Missing the two checks isSetWallpaperAllowed and isWallpaperSupported, allowing a managed user to change their wallpaper.
14. startUpdateCredentialsSession (ACMS) Missing checks canUserModifyAccounts and canUserModifyAccountsForType, allowing a user to trigger an update for the credentials of
online accounts like Google and Facebook even when restricted.
VC2: App Ops
15. noteProxyOperation (AOMS) Missing the verifyIncomingUid check, which checks for a signature permission, allowing non-system apps to call this entry point.
16. getLastLocation (LMS) A majority of the entry points in the LMS use the AppOpsManager check checkOp, which is not intended for security, instead of the security
check noteOp. getLastLocation uses the correct check.
VC3: Pre23
17. setStayOnSetting (POMS) On systems with API 23 or above, the pre23 protection level allows any permission to be automatically granted to non-system apps built
targeting the API 22 or below. This vulnerability allows non-system apps to access 6 additional entry points protected by the WRITE_SETTINGS
signature permission, as WRITE_SETTINGS also has the pre23 protection level.
VC4: Miscellaneous
18. unbindBackupAgent (AMS) Missing check for if caller is performing a backup, allowing any app to disrupt the backup process of another app.
19. getPersistentApplications (PMS) Missing system UID check, allowing any non-system app to discover what apps and services permantly run in the background.
20. logEvents (MLS) Incorrect check for permission CONNECTIVITY_INTERNAL, should check DUMP when writing sensitive data to logs.
21. getMonitoringTypes (GHS) Missing check checkPermission, allowing a caller access both fine and coarse levels of geofence location data.
22. getStatusOfMonitoringType (GHS) Missing check checkPermission, with similar implications as getMonitoringTypes.
23. setApplicationEnabledSetting (PMS) Missing isPackageDeviceAdmin check, allowing an app to disable an active administrator app.
24. setComponentEnabledSetting (PMS) Missing isPackageDeviceAdmin check, allowing an app to disable components of an active administrator app.
25. convertFromTranslucent (AMS) Missing check for enforceNotIsolatedCaller, allowing a isolated process to affect the transparency of windows.
26. notifyLockedProfile (AMS) Missing check for enforceNotIsolatedCaller, allowing an isolated process to trigger a retrun to the home screen.
27. setActiveScorer (NSS) Missing BROADCAST_NETWORK_PRIVILEGED permission check which is always paired with the SCORE_NETWORKS permission check.
28. getCompleteVoiceMailNumberForSubscriber (PSIC) Incorrect check for permission CALL_PRIVILEGED instead of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE results in coarse-grained enforcement.
AMS=ActivityManagerService; AOMS=AppOpsManagerService; CS=ConnectivityService; DPMS=DevicePolicyManagerService; LMS=LocationManagerService; PMS=PackageManagerService;
POMS=PowerManagerService; UMS=UserManagerService; WPMS=WallpaperManagerService; PSIC=PhoneSubInfoController; ACMS=AccountManagerService; MLS=MetricsLoggerService;
GHS=GeofenceHardwareService; NSS=NetworkScoreService
anagerService, any user can learn of the applications another user
has installed, as the entry point does not enforce any checks other
than checking if the user being queried exists. Similarly, the entry
point hasUserRestriction in the UserManagerService, previously
used as the motivating example, is not protected with the signature
level permission MANAGE_USERS, which is present in the similar hasB-
aseUserRestriction entry point. This omitted authorization check
allows a user to know of the restrictions placed on other users,
which is security-sensitive information that should not be public.
The entry points getPackagesHoldingPermissions, checkUriPermis-
sion and grantUriPermission similarly leak sensitive information.
We experimentally confirmed the existence of both the vulner-
abilities in hasUserRestriction and getInstalledApplications in
Android 7.1.1 as well as Android 8.1. We have submitted bug re-
ports to Google and received ”moderate” ASR severity level for
both the bugs. Further, we confirmed that the vulnerability in get-
PackagesHoldingPermissions was fixed in Android 8.1. As a result,
we could not submit it to Google’s bug program, which only con-
siders bugs affecting the latest version of Android. All remaining
vulnerabilities have been reported to Google.
2. Operating Across Users: Missing authorization checks in 4
entry points (i.e., 6→9 in Table 2) allow users to bypass multi-user
restrictions and perform sensitive operations on behalf of other
users. For example, we discovered that the entry point killPackag-
eDependents takes in a userId as an argument but does not actually
verify whether the calling user is allowed to perform operations on
behalf of the supplied userId. This allows any user to kill the apps
and background processes of any other user. A similar flaw in entry
point setUserProvisioningState enables any user to set the state
of any other user profile to states such as "managed", "unmanaged",
or "finalized". Such changes may be dangerous. For instance, a user
may be able to set their managed enterprise profile to unmanaged,
releasing it from the administrator’s control.
Fortunately, all four entry points described in this category can
only be called from apps installed on the system image (i.e., are
protected by authorization checks that ensure this). This indirectly
mitigates some damage, by making the vulnerabilities difficult to ex-
ploit from a third-party app. However, capability leaks in privileged
apps may allow such vulnerabilities to be exploited by third-party
apps, as prior work has demonstrated [25, 44]. All of these vulnera-
bilities have been reported to Google.
3. Modifying User Settings Before A User Exists: Both the entry
points installExistingPackageAsUser and setApplicationHiddenS-
ettingAsUser do not perform the authorization check exists, which
verifies if a the userId passed into the entry points represents a valid
user. Without this check, it is possible for a caller to install an app
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1 /** Do a quick check for whether an application might be
2 * able to perform an operation. This is not a security
3 * check; you must use noteOp or startOp for your actual
4 * security checks , which also ensure that the given uid
5 * and package name are consistent. ... */
6 int checkOp(int op , int uid , String packageName) {...}
Figure 7: The comment above checkOp from the class AppOpsManager
that states it should not be used as a security check.
for a non-existent user or hide an app from a non-existent user.
Thus, when the user for whom this change was made is actually
created, these settings will already be in place. These entry points
are only callable from systems apps; however, system apps may be
compromised or may leak capabilities, and the exists check needs to
be in place to prevent system apps from being tricked into allowing
users to install apps in profiles that have yet to be created (e.g.,
installing apps in a future enterprise profile). We have submitted
these vulnerabilities to Google.
4. Allowing Users to Bypass Restrictions: Vulnerabilities in entry
points 12→14 from Table 2 allow a user to perform operations
despite the restrictions placed on the user profile. For instance, the
entry point setAlwaysOnVpnPackage does not check for the restric-
tion no_config_vpn, allowing a managed user to set the always on
VPN for the user profile to another application, effectively switch-
ing VPN connections. The entry points setWallpaperComponent and
startUpdateCredentialsSession have similar vulnerabilities. All of
these vulnerabilities have been reported to Google.
VC2: AppOps:ACMiner identified weaknesses related to App Ops.
One such vulnerability lies in the noteProxyOperation of the AppOps-
Service. The entry point makes a note of an application performing
some operation on behalf of some other application through IPC.
However, unlike other entry points in the AppOpsService, notePro-
xyOperation is missing the authorization check verifyIncomingUid
which includes a check for the signature level permission UPDATE-
_APP_OPS_STATS. Without verifyIncomingUid, it is possible for any
non-system app to use noteProxyOperation to query the restrictions
a user has placed on other apps, thus retrieving information that
should not be available to non-system apps.
We discovered a set of identical vulnerabilities in App Ops
through our analysis of the getLastLocation entry point in the
LocationManagerService, which ACMiner pointed out as having in-
consistent authorization checks. The getLastLocation entry point
calls the authorization check reportLocationAccessNoThrow which
performs the check noteOpNoThrow from the AppOpsManager, a wrap-
per for the AppOpsService. ACMiner correctly identified the use of
noteOpNoThrow as an inconsistency since a majority of the entry
points (9) in LocationManagerService use the authorization check
checkLocationAccess which performs the check checkOp from the
AppOpsManager. However, as Figure 7 shows, the comment above
the checkOp method clearly states that checkOp should not be used
to perform a security check. Instead, one of the various forms of
noteOp should be used. This implies that all 9 entry points using the
context query checkLocationAccess suffer from a vulnerability, and
that the use of reportLocationAccessNoThrow in getLastLocation
is actually appropriate. This instance demonstrates an interesting
outcome of the use of consistency analysis in ACMiner. That is, our
use of consistency analysis in ACMiner is also useful in identify-
ing instances, where the majority of the related entry points are
<permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS"
android:protectionLevel="signature|preinstalled|appop|pre23" />
Figure 8: The permission protection levels of WRITE_SETTINGS in the
AndroidManifest.xml file [3]
vulnerable. As described previously, for simplicity, we count this
cluster of vulnerable entry points as a single vulnerability, which
has been submitted to Google.
VC3: Pre23: ACMiner identified a group of vulnerabilities related
to Android’s pre23 permission protection level. The entry point
setStayOnSetting in the PowerManagerService uses the authoriza-
tion check checkAndNoteWriteSettingsOperation, which checks if
an app has the signature level permission WRITE_SETTINGS. Permis-
sions with the signature protection level can only be granted to
system apps (i.e., apps that were originally packaged with the sys-
tem image). However, as shown in Figure 8, WRITE_SETTINGS has an
additional protection level of pre23, which has an interesting effect
on Android versions 6.0 or above (i.e., API 23 or above). It allows
permissions marked as pre23 to be granted to non-system apps that
target API 22 or below [22]. Thus, as a result of the improperly
defined permission protection levels for WRITE_SETTINGS, the pre23
grants non-system apps access to a signature level permission.
The damage resulting from the pre23 vulnerability is not re-
stricted to the entry point setStayOnSetting. A simple search for the
use of the permission WRITE_SETTINGS in the authorization checks
ACMiner mined for all entry points in the system revealed 13 addi-
tional entry points checking for the permission WRITE_SETTINGS, 6
of which can be called from a non-system app using the pre23 vul-
nerability (i.e., these 6 entry points are not protected with any other
signature permission). Of the 6, the following 5 entry points deal
with tethering and are located in the ConnectivityService: setU-
sbTethering, stopTethering, startTethering, tether, and untether.
The last setWifiApEnabled was located in the WifiServiceImpl and
allows a caller to set some WIFI access point configuration, causing
the device to connect or disconnect from any WIFI access point the
caller provides. These entry points are clearly more important to
protect than setStayOnSetting, and an adversary may be able to do
considerable damage by exploiting them. We do not count these
entry points in our initial list of 28 vulnerabilities. All entry points
affected by the pre23 vulnerability have been submitted to Google.
VC4: Miscellaneous Vulnerabilities: ACMiner also identified 11
vulnerabilities related to information leaks, denial of service, dis-
abling of administrator apps, and a mixture of other minor vulnera-
bilities. All of these vulnerabilities have been reported to Google.
6 NON-SECURITY INCONSISTENCIES
ACMiner identified 423 inconsistencies (i.e., rules) that did not rep-
resent vulnerabilities. Aside from the 20 rules that were caused by
easily fixed bugs in ACMiner, we resolve these non-security incon-
sistencies to their likely causes, and classify them into 9 categories,
shown in Table 3 (RQ3). The first three categories point to irregular
coding practices, i.e., (1) inconsistent application of short-cuts to
speed up access, (2) access bugs or discrepancies in how the permis-
sion should be used as per the documentation, or (3) inconsistent
application of hard-coded checks that would potentially lead to
vulnerabilities on future updates. The remaining 6 categories point
to issues that could be corrected by engineering improvements to
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Table 3: Non-security Inconsistencies
Type of Inconsistency Number of Rules
1. Shortcuts to Speed-Up Access 7
2. Fixing Access Bugs 2
3. Potential Vulnerabilities 16
4. Difference in Functionality 189
5. Checks With Different Arguments 66
6. Noise in Captured Checks 53
7. Restricted to Special Callers 37
8. Semantic Groups of Checks 23
9. Equivalent Checks 10
ACMiner, such as considering semantic equivalence between au-
thorization checks, or the integration of call graph comparison and
method-name comparison to mitigate the analysis of functionally
different entry points. We provide additional details on all of the 9
categories in Appendix H.
7 LIMITATIONS
While ACMiner is effective at discovering inconsistencies that lead
to vulnerabilities, consistency analysis has a general limitation, i.e.,
it may not discover vulnerabilities that are consistent throughout
code. Further, for precision, ACMiner does not handle the invoca-
tion of secondary entry points, i.e., calls to entry points from within
other entry points. ACMiner omits the ordering of the authoriza-
tion checks and hence does not identify improper operator use in
control predicates, which we plan to explore in the future. Moreover,
ACMiner’s semi-automated analysis requires the participation of
domain experts. However, as Section 5 demonstrates, our design
significantly reduces manual effort in contrast with the manual
validation of system services. As we have already analyzed AOSP
version 7.1.1, only minor input is needed to analyze newer ver-
sions or vendor modifications. Finally, ACMiner shares the general
choices made by Android static analysis techniques for precision,
i.e., it does not consider native code, or runtime modifications (e.g.,
reflection, dynamic code loading, Message Handlers).
8 RELATEDWORK
ACMiner addresses a problem that has conceptual origins in prior
work on authorization hook validation for traditional systems. Early
investigations targeted the Linux Security Modules (LSM) hook
placement in the Linux kernel, using techniques such as type analy-
sis using CQUAL [48], program dominance [49], and dynamic anal-
ysis to create authorization graphs from control flow traces [13, 30].
As the lack of ground truth is a general challenge for hook valida-
tion, prior work commonly uses consistency analysis [13, 30, 42].
Closest to our work is AutoISES [42], which infers security specifi-
cations from code bases such as the Linux kernel and Xen. However,
AutoISES assumes a known set of security functions or security-
specific data structures, whereas ACMiner identifies a diverse set
of authorization checks in the Android middleware.
The closest to our approach is prior work on authorization
hook validation in the Android platform, i.e., Kratos [39] and Ace-
Droid [2]. ACMiner distinguishes itself from Kratos and AceDroid
through its deep analysis of Android’s system services, and its
significantly improved coverage of Android’s authorization checks.
Kratos [39] compares a small subset of Android’s authorization
checks across entry points of the same system image to look for in-
consistent checks between different system services. ACMiner does
not analyze for consistency across services. Instead, we hypothesize
that entry points within a single service are similar in purpose, and
hence, analyze the consistency of the authorization checks by com-
paring the entry points of every system service with other entry
points in the same service. Further, ACMiner’s semi-automated
approach for identifying authorization checks results in a 2552%
improvement over Kratos’ manually-curated list (Section 5).
Similarly, AceDroid [2] evaluates the consistency of the autho-
rization checks among different vendor-modified Android images,
and hence differs from ACMiner in terms of its objective. Ace-
Droid makes key improvements over Kratos, as it considers various
non-standard context queries not considered by Kratos. However,
AceDroid also relies on a manually-defined list of context queries,
which may produce only approximately 71% of the context queries
that ACMiner is able to find (Section 5). While a quantitative com-
parison with Kratos and AceDroid is difficult due to the unavail-
ability of code/data, this qualitative comparison demonstrates the
remarkable improvements made by ACMiner’s novel techniques.
Finally, recent literature is rich with static and dynamic pro-
gram analysis of third-party Android apps targeted at privacy in-
fringement [14, 21, 27], malware [18, 28, 47], as well as vulner-
abilities [10, 15]. As the Android platform and apps use similar
programming abstractions, researchers have applied these tools
and techniques to the platform code, e.g., for providing a mapping
between APIs and corresponding permissions [5, 9, 19] or automat-
ically identifies privacy-sensitive sources and sinks [4]. Moreover,
prior work has also studied the platform code, to analyze OEM apps
for capability leaks (e.g., Woodpecker [25] and SEFA [44]), discover
privilege escalation on update vulnerabilities (e.g., Xing et al. [45]),
or uncover gaps in the file access control policies in OEM firmware
images (e.g., Zhou et al. [50]). While ACMiner shares a similar ob-
jective, unlike prior work, ACMiner provides an automated and
systematic investigation of core platform services.
9 CONCLUSION
This paper provides an approach for the systematic and in-depth
analysis of a crucial portion of Android’s reference monitor, i.e., its
system services. We design ACMiner, a static analysis framework
that comprehensively identifies a diverse array of authorization
checks used in Android’s system services, and then adapts the well-
founded technique of association-rule mining to detect inconsistent
access control among service entry points. We discover 28 security
vulnerabilities by analyzing AOSP version 7.1 using ACMiner, and
demonstrate significantly higher coverage of checks than the state
of the art. Our work demonstrates the feasibility of in-depth analy-
sis of Android’s system services with ACMiner, as it significantly
reduces the number of entry points that must be analyzed, from
over 4000 with millions of lines of code to a mere 246.
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A EXTRACTING JAVA CLASS FILES
ACMiner first obtains the Java class files for the desired version
of Android. Soot analyzes Java programs by translating their code
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into its own Java code representation (i.e., Jimple). It parses .class,
.java, .jimple, and .jar files. The recent incorporation of Dexpler [8]
into Soot adds support for .dex files and .jar files containing .dex
files (i.e., .apk files).
ACMiner is designed to analyze both AOSP and OEM builds of
the Android middleware. As such, ACMiner must process Android’s
system.img and extract the class files. If the system.img contains
.odex or .oat files, ACMiner decompiles and recompiles them into
.dex using baksmali/smali [26]. As shown in Figure 3, ACMiner
automates this process and outputs a .jar file containing all the
class files of the Android middleware in Soot’s Jimple format. This
.jar containing Jimple files is then then used on all subsequent runs
of ACMiner. This pre-processing can take upwards of 20 minutes
and saves unnecessary re-computation.
B EXTRACTING SYSTEM SERVICES AND
ENTRY POINTS
Android’s middleware is largely composed of isolated services that
only communicate through predefined Binder boundaries. This
division allows each service to be analyzed separately, and to define
each service by the code reachable through its Binder entry points.
ACMiner extracts system services and their entry points similar to
PScout [5], Kratos [39], and AceDroid [2].
Specifically, ACMiner uses Soot’s class hierarchy information
to find all classes that: (1) are subclasses of android.os.Binder and
(2) implement the onTransact method. Next, ACMiner identifies
the signatures of the handler methods that onTransact methods
call. Our insight is that all such methods are invoked on the same
receiver object (i.e., this). Note that handler methods need not be
implemented in the stub class itself: it can also be implemented
in subclasses. ACMiner therefore uses Soot’s class hierarchy in-
formation to identify all of the stub’s subclasses. Finally, the class
and method information is used to identify all concrete methods in
these stub and subclasses that match the handler method signatures.
These concrete methods become the entry points for analysis.
C THE EXCLUDE LIST
A subset of the exclude list is displayed in Table 4 which groups
the excluded elements by the five different procedures we use for
excluding elements of the call graph (see our website [1] for the
complete exclude list). The first procedure Class Path will exclude
any method of a class whose full class name either exactly equals
the listed name or starts with the listed name when the listed
name ends with .* or $*. The second Interface excludes any method
that implements a method of an interface that exactly equals the
listed name. The third Interface All excludes all methods of all
classes that implement directly or indirectly an interface that exactly
equals the listed name. The fourth Superclass excludes any method
that implements a method of a class that exactly equals the listed
name. The fifth Superclass All excludes all methods of all classes
that extend directly or indirectly a class that exactly equals the
listed name. Finally, Method Signature excludes a single method
that matches the supplied method signature.
To define the exclude list, we explored the call graph, looking
for classes and methods that form roots of call graph areas not
useful to our analysis. We started by broadly excluding, using the
Table 4: Subset of the Excluded List for the Call Graph
Procedure Excluded Elements
Class Path java.*, javax.*, gov.nist.javax.*, org.*, sun.*,
com.sun.*, com.ibm.*, com.google.common.*, soot.*, junit.*,
com.android.dex.*, dalvik.*, android.test.*, android.text.*,
android.util.*, android.animation.*,
android.view.animation.*, android.icu.*,
android.database.sqlite.*, android.content.res.*,
com.android.org.bouncycastle.*, android.graphics.*,
android.preference.*, android.os.UserHandle,
android.os.Process, android.os.Binder, android.os.Debug,
android.net.Uri, android.net.Uri$*, libcore.util.Objects,
android.os.Bundle, android.os.Parcel, android.view.View,
libcore.io.IoUtils
Interface java.lang.Iterable, java.util.Iterator, java.util.ListIterator,
java.lang.Comparable,
java.util.Comparator, java.util.Collection, java.util.Deque,
java.util.Enumeration, java.util.List, java.util.Map,
java.util.Map$Entry, java.util.NavigableMap,
java.util.NavigableSet, java.util.Queue, java.util.Set,
java.util.SortedMap, java.util.SortedSet,
java.lang.Runnable, android.os.Parcelable,
android.os.IInterface,
Interface All java.lang.AutoCloseable, libcore.io.Os,
android.database.Cursor
Superclass java.lang.Object, android.graphics.drawable.Drawable,
android.content.Context
Superclass All com.android.internal.telephony.SmsMessageBase,
java.lang.Throwable, android.app.Dialog,
android.view.View
Method Signature DevicePolicyManagerService: void write-
ToXml(XmlSerializer)
UserManagerService: void writeUserLP(UserData)
UserManagerService: void writeUserListLP()
Class Path procedure, any packages that are not Android related
as these are generic Java libraries and will not contain Android
specific authorization checks. Since these generic Java libraries
often contain interfaces and classes implemented and extended in
code outside the Java libraries, we also found it necessary to use the
Interface and Superclass procedures to cover subclasses of these in
Android specific code. Next, as we still observed significant bloat, we
broadened our search to include Android specific code. We started
excluding packages such as android.icu.* and com.android.org.-
bouncycastle.* as these are common non-Android libraries that
were integrated into the Android specific code but hold no Android-
specific authorization checks. Lastly, we looked for methods in the
call graph with a large number of outgoing edges and/or a large
number of outgoing edges for the same method invoke statement,
adding the methods and classes to the exclude list as needed.
In addition to those described above, the exclude list has a few
more additions and omissions. First, while com.android.Context
is excluded using the Superclass procedure, all permission check
methods in the class are omitted from this exclusion. This enables
ACMiner to capture the authorization checks inside these various
important methods. Second, classes such as android.os.UserHandle
and android.os.Process have many authorization check methods,
yet are elements of the exclude list. Adding such classes to the
exclude list gives context to the operations these authorization-
checks perform. Such context would be lost otherwise since the
actual checks involve manipulating integers values.
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D SIMPLIFICATION OF AUTHORIZATION
CHECKS
We apply the following 10 simplification rules when generating
authorization checks for a entry point and use the value ALL in
our output to indicate that a variable can be assigned any value. (1)
Any variable that does not represent a variable of a primitive type
or a string type is assigned the value ALL. We found such variables
were safely ignored as they did not add any additional context to
the authorization checks being output and instead generated a large
amount of noise when included. (2) To handle loops and recursion,
a value of ALL is assigned if a cycle is detected when resolving
the possible values for a variable. (3) When a variable represents
a parameter of the current entry point method, a value of ALL is
assigned as the parameter’s value could be anything. (4) A value of
ALL is assigned to all variables obtaining there value from lengthof,
instanceof, new, and cast expressions as no new context is gained
about the authorization checks by including these expressions. (5)
If an expression retrieving a value from an array has the value ALL
for either its index or its array reference, then a value of ALL is
assigned to the value retrieved from the array as no new context
will be gained from such expressions. (6) Variables assigned from
the return of a method in the class Bundle always get assigned the
value ALL since Bundle is used to pass data through Binder and
can therefore be anything. (7) For a control predicates or context
queries when computing the product of all the possible variables
and the values for each variable, if the possible set of values for a
variable contains ALL then the set is transformed into a singleton
set containing only the value ALL. (8) If a variable is assigned a value
of NULL and has any other value assigned to it, the NULL value is
ignored so as to remove NULL checks. (9) When dealing with the
final set of values generated from a control predicate (i.e., a set of
pairs), we remove a pair from this set if: the pair has NULL or ALL
for either of its values, the pair has a constant value for both of its
values, or both of the values in the pair are equivalent. (10) As Java
object equals methods when used in a conditional statements take
the form if(o1.equals(o2) == 0), the pair generated by ACMiner
representing the authorization check would normally contain one
entry for the value of the equals method and one entry for the
constant value being compared. However, what is really desired is
the values of the objects being compared by the equals (e.g., in the
case of string comparisons). As such, we simplify the representation
of such authorization checks by reconstructing the pairs so that
they contain values for the calling object and the argument object
(i.e., o1 and o2) of the equals method.
E REPRESENTING CONTEXT QUERIES
To generalize our definition of context queries, we developed a
representation that allows us to express the context queries as a
combination of regular expressions and several string matching
procedures used to describe the package, class, and/or method name,
combined with conditional logic (i.e., and, or, and not). Table 5
outlines a complete list of the base expressions used to define the
regular expressions and string matching procedures. Figure 9 shows
an example expression from the set of expressions generated for
1http://androidxref.com/7.1.1_r6/xref/frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/a
m/ActivityManagerService.java#11401
Table 5: Method and Field Matching Expressions
Operation Description
starts-with-
(package|class|name)
Resolves to true if the package, class, or name
starts with the given string for some method
or field.
ends-with-
(package|class|name)
Resolves to true if the package, class, or name
ends with the given string for some method
or field.
contains-
(package|class|name)
Resolves to true if the package, class, or name
contains the given string for some method or
field.
equals-(package|class|name) Resolves to true if the package, class, or name
equals the given string for some method or
field.
regex-(package|class|name) Resolves to true if any part of the package,
class, or name matches the given regular ex-
pression for some method or field.
regex-name-words Resolves to true if the method or field name
matches any part of the given regular expres-
sion when the name is split at word boundary
indicators.
regex-class-words Resolves to true if the method or field class
matches any part of the given regular expres-
sion when the class is split at word bound-
ary indicators. Note this operation takes in a
second argument which specifies which class
name to match in the case of an inner class.
The indexing starts at 0 for the inner most
class name and increases by 1 for each outer
class name. An index of -1 means the regex
can match any of the class names from inner
most to outer most.
(and
(or
(starts-with-package android.)
(starts-with-package com.android.)
)
(regex-name-words `^can\s(clear\sidentity|draw\soverlays
|run\shere|user\smodify\saccounts|access\sapp\swidget
|read\sphone\s(state|number )| caller\saccess\smock)\b`
)
)
Figure 9: An example of the expressions used to describe context
queries.
Android AOSP 7.1.1 that describes, along with several others, the
context query canClearIdentity shown in line 19 of Figure 10. In
Figure 9 we see the expression is actually made up of 4 different
operations. As one would imagine, and and or operations behave
just like their counterparts in normal conditional logic. Furthermore,
starts-with-package behaves as expected in that it checks to see if the
package name of the class in which a method is defined starts with
a given string, in this case either android. or com.android.. Finally,
regex-name-words is a bit more complicated in that checks to see if
any part of a method name matches the given regular expression
when the method name is split by word boundary indicators (i.e.,
splitting the name at capital letters in the case of camel-case or at
an underscore character). That is, for the method named canClearI-
dentity, the method name is transformed into the string can clear
identity before the regular expression matching is performed. By
splitting the method name at word boundary indicators, this allows
the regular expressions to be defined in terms of key words without
having to worry about situations where one word might contain
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1 public String getProviderMimeType(Uri uri , int userId) {
2 enforceNotIsolatedCaller ();
3 int callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid ();
4 int callingPid = Binder.getCallingPid ();
5 boolean clearedIdentity = false;
6 long ident = 0;
7 if (canClearIdentity(callingPid , callingUid , userId )) {
8 clearedIdentity = true;
9 ident = Binder.clearCallingIdentity ();
10 }
11 ...
12 }
13
14 void enforceNotIsolatedCaller(String caller) {
15 if (UserHandle.isIsolated(Binder.getCallingUid ()))
16 throw new SecurityException ();
17 }
18
19 boolean canClearIdentity(int pid , int uid , int userId) {
20 if (UserHandle.getUserId(uid) == userId)
21 return true;
22 if (checkComponentPermission(INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS , pid ,
23 uid , -1, true) == 0
24 || checkComponentPermission(INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL , pid ,
25 uid , -1, true) == 0)
26 return true;
27 return false;
28 }
Figure 10: Pseudo-code from the ActivityManagerService class.1
others in its spelling (e.g., is and list).
F DEFINING CONTROL PREDICATES FILTER
The first step in defining the control predicate filer was to have
a domain expert explore the unique fields, strings, and methods
(i.e., elements) used in every marked conditional statement to de-
cide which of these elements are used in an authorization context
and which are unimportant. In general, the exploration of these
lists proceeds as follows: (1) Start by looking at the control predi-
cates contained within context queries and the name of the context
queries themselves. As any element used within control predicates
of context queries are likely important, we can already include these
elements in our list of elements that indicate control predicates.
However, by studying the control predicates, we can also gain fur-
ther insight into what control predicates might look like elsewhere
in Android’s code. Moreover, we can learn key words that might
help with identifying additional elements with authorization con-
text from our lists. (2) Perform a search on our lists of elements
using the key words learned from the previous step as these can
indicate common functionality. (3) Verify if the elements resulting
from the previous search are actually used in control predicates by
looking at both how all conditional statements use an element and
the overall flow of the methods containing the conditional state-
ments using the element. Add any that are determined to be used
in control predicates to our list of elements that indicate control
predicates. Note, when recording elements that indicate control
predicates it is also important to indicate exactly how the elements
are being used in control predicates as certain elements may only
be authorization related in specific context. For example, as shown
in Figure 13, some control predicates involve the use of methods
that only when combined together in a specific way construct an
authorization check (e.g., the string equals method and the get
method of SystemProperties when get is provided the string SY-
STEM_DEBUGGABLE). (4) On the remaining unchecked elements, go
through each element as in step 3. If new key words are added to
our key word list as a result of finding a new indicator element,
<KeepFieldValueUse Value="(and
(regex-name-words `\b(flag(s)?)\b`)
(regex-class-words `\b((uri\spermission)
|(( package|application )\ smanager\sservice)
|permission\s(state|data)| package\ssetting
|layout\sparams|display |( activity|application
|provider|user|service|display|device )\sinfo)\b` 0)
)">
<Restrictions UseUnion="false" >
<IsInArithmeticChain HandleConstants="false"/>
</Restrictions >
</KeepFieldValueUse >
Figure 11: An example of the an entry in the control predicate filter.
This entry matches a number of flag field control predicates, such
as Figure 13 line 6, by their name, class, and use that have authoriza-
tion context.
perform steps 2-3 again. Keep performing step 4 until all elements
in our lists have been processed.
In defining the control predicate filter, it is important to under-
stand that the use of the fields, methods, and strings identified do
not always indicate control predicates. Instead, they indicate con-
trol predicates when used in a specific context. As such, any filter
we design will have to allow us to specify such a context along with
the fields, methods, and strings. Therefore, while we cannot rely
solely on the expressions outlined in Table 5 we can reuse them. We
use a customized XML document that ACMiner takes in as input as
shown in Figure 3 as our filter specification. The filter specification
is constructed from a group of rules that are conditionally joined
together using the and, or, and not operators into one large con-
ditional expression that specifies if a given conditional statement
should be included in our final list of control predicates.
Figure 11 provides an example rule from our filter specifica-
tion. It details the rule KeepFieldValueUse used to match the control
predicate at line 6 of Figure 13. As shown, the rule uses the ex-
pressions outlined in Table 5 to first identify the use of a flag field
in a conditional statement that may potentially indicate a control
predicate. The rule then further restricts what is considered a con-
trol predicate by applying the restriction IsInArithmaticChain. This
restriction only allows conditional statements to be considered con-
trol predicates if the field or method return value is used in a chain
of arithmetic expressions whose resolution is then used in the con-
ditional statement. The arithmetic operations are all standard Java
binary and unary operators (e.g., +, -, ==, !=, and !). Such a restric-
tion allows us to exclude situations like if(0 == method(flag))
where the flag field is being used in a conditional statement as an
argument to a method while including conditional statements who
use field and method return values as in Figure 13 line 6.
To further illustrate how rules are expressed in our filter specifi-
cation, we take a look at the more complex example of Figure 12
which is a rule to match control predicates like line 5 of Figure 13.
The rule KeepMethodReturnValueUse specification is similar to that
of KeepFieldValueUse from our previous example except it has an
additional set of restrictions. These restrictions are all forms of the
IsValueUsedInMethodCall which enables us to specify the possible
arguments for a method as well as the possible calling object of
the method. In this case, we have two sets of nested IsValueUsedIn-
MethodCall restrictions the results of which are ored together when
evaluated. The outer most IsValueUsedInMethodCall restriction in
either set specifies that only the methods whose return value is
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<KeepMethodReturnValueUse Value="(equal-name equals)">
<Restrictions UseUnion="false" >
<IsInArithmeticChain HandleConstants="false"/>
<Restrictions UseUnion="true" >
<IsValueUsedInMethodCall Position="-1" >
<Matcher class="MethodMatcher" Value="(and
(regex-class-words `\bsystem\sproperties\b` 0)
(regex-name-words `\bget\b`)
)"/>
<Restrictions UseUnion="false" >
<IsValueUsedInMethodCall Position="0" >
<Matcher class="StringMatcher" Value="(
regex `ro\.( factorytest|test_harness
|debuggable|secure)`
)"/>
</IsValueUsedInMethodCall >
</Restrictions >
</IsValueUsedInMethodCall >
<IsValueUsedInMethodCall Position="0" >
...
// Same data as
// <IsValueUsedInMethodCall Position="-1" >
// except flipped
</IsValueUsedInMethodCall >
</Restrictions >
</Restrictions >
</KeepMethodReturnValueUse >
Figure 12: An example of the an entry in the control predicate fil-
ter. This entry specifically matches situations such as the control
predicate shown in Figure 13 line 5.
used as part of the equals call, whose name contains get, and who
is a member of the class SystemProperties be considered a control
predicate. The Position attribute of IsValueUsedInMethodCall spec-
ifies where this restriction is to check for a value matching this
description (i.e., -1 for the calling object and 0 for the first argument
of the method). The inner IsValueUsedInMethodCall restriction of
each set then further specifies that any method matching the outer
restrictions description must also take as an argument at position
0 a string that matches the given regex. Combining all these re-
strictions together, we get a rule that says to treat any conditional
statements as cps if they are checking if a valueA equals some string
where A is the return value of a get method in SystemProperties
retrieving the associated system value for some given key.
Aside from rules like those presented above, the filter also covers
a few corner cases. Mainly context queries and loop conditionals.
As defined in Section 4.1.2, any conditional statement in a context
query or using a context query’s return value should be considered
a control predicate. As such, the filter should always include these
conditional statements as control predicates. The filter uses the
description of context queries (see Section 4.2.1) to identify context
queries and preserve conditional statements as control predicates if
a conditional statement is within the body of a context query or the
context query’s return value is used in an chain of arithmetic ex-
pressions. Moreover, as mentioned above, one of the main sources
of noise in ACMiner’s view of the authorization checks was loop
conditionals (i.e., the conditional statements that decide if the con-
trol flow should exit a loop). As loops conditionals are not important
when viewing Android’s authorization checks the filter explicitly
rejects all conditional statements that are loop conditionals.
2http://androidxref.com/7.1.1_r6/xref/frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/a
m/ActivityManagerService.java#21497
1 public boolean dumpHeap(String process , int userId , ...) {
2 if(checkCallingPermission(SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER) != 0)
3 throw new SecurityException ();
4 ProcessRecord proc = findProcess(process , userId );
5 if (!("1".equals(SystemProperties.get(SYSTEM_DEBUGGABLE , "0")))
6 && 0 == (proc.info.flags & ApplicationInfo.FLAG_DEBUGGABLE ))
7 throw new SecurityException ();
8 ...
9 return true;
10 }
11
12 ProcessRecord findProcess(String process , int userId) {
13 int pid = Binder.getCallingPid ();
14 int uid = Binder.getCallingUid ();
15 userId = handleIncomingUser(pid , uid , userId , true ,
16 ALLOW_FULL_ONLY , null);
17 ...
18 return proc;
19 }
20
21 int checkCallingPermission(String permission) {
22 int pid = Binder.getCallingPid ();
23 int uid = UserHandle.getAppId(Binder.getCallingUid ());
24 return checkComponentPermission(permission , pid , uid ,
25 -1, true);
26 }
27
28 int checkComponentPermission(String permission , int pid , int uid ,
29 int owningUid , boolean exported) {
30 if(pid == MY_PID)
31 return 0;
32 int appId = UserHandle.getAppId(uid);
33 if(appId == 0 || appId == 1000
34 || UserHandle.isIsolated(uid)
35 || (owningUid >= 0 && UserHandle.isSameApp(uid , owningUid )))
36 return 0;
37 if (! exported)
38 return 1;
39 return checkUidPermission(permission , uid);
40 }
Figure 13: Pseudo-code from the ActivityManagerService class.2
G COMPLETENESS PROOF FOR CLOSED
ASSOCIATION RULE MINING
Lemma G.1. If X =⇒ Y is a closed association rule and not
confident (i.e., conf(X =⇒ Y ) < minconf ), there does not exist an
itemset Y ′ ⊂ Y where X =⇒ Y ′ is a confident association rule (i.e.,
conf(X =⇒ Y ′) ≥ minconf ) unless X ∪Y ′ is also a closed frequent
itemset.
Proof. Let conf(X ∪ Y ) = σ (X∪Y )σ (X ) and conf(X ∪ Y ′) =
σ (X∪Y ′)
σ (X )
where Y ′ ⊂ Y . If conf(X =⇒ Y ′) ≥ conf(X =⇒ Y ), then
σ (X∪Y ′) ≥ σ (X∪Y ). Due to themonotonicity property,σ (X∪Y ′) ≥
σ (X∪Y ), becauseY ′ ⊂ Y and σ (Y ′) ≥ σ (Y ). If σ (X∪Y ′) = σ (X∪Y ),
then conf(X ∪Y ′) < minconf . If σ (X ∪Y ′) > σ (X ∪Y ), thenX ∪Y ′
is also a closed itemset according to Lemma G.2. □
Lemma G.2. IfX∪Y is a frequent closed itemset, thenX∪Y ′ where
Y ′ ⊂ Y is also a frequent closed itemset if σ (X ∪ Y ′) > σ (X ∪ Y ).
Proof. Let σ (X ∪ Y ′) > σ (X ∪ Y ) and α(X ∪ Y ) , ∅. For X ∪
Y ′ to not be a frequent closed itemset, then ∃Y ′′ ⊃ Y ′ | σ (X ∪
Y ′) = σ (X ∪ Y ′′) by the definition of a frequent closed itemset. If
σ (X ∪ Y ′′) = σ (X ∪ Y ′), then α(X ∪ Y ′′) = α(X ∪ Y ′). Further,
since σ (X ∪ Y ′) > σ (X ∪ Y ) ∧ α(Y ) , ∅, then α(Y ) ⊂ α(Y ′′). If
α(Y ) 1 α(Y ′′), then σ (X ∪ Y ′′) < σ (X ∪ Y ′) by definition. Since
Y ⊃ Y ′ exists and σ (X ∪ Y ′′) = σ (X ∪ Y ′), then σ (X ∪ Y ∪ Y ′′) =
min(σ (X ∪ Y ),σ (X ∪ Y ′′)) by the monotonicity property. Since
σ (X∪Y ′) > σ (X∪Y )∧σ (X∪Y ′) = σ (X∪Y ′′) =⇒ σ (X∪Y∪Y ′′) =
σ (X ∪ Y ). Therefore, ∄X ∪ Y ′′ | σ (X ∪ Y ′′) = σ (X ∪ Y ′), because
X ∪Y is defined as a closed itemset. Thus, X ∪Y ′ is also a frequent
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closed itemset. □
H NON-SECURITY INCONSISTENCIES
ACMiner identified 423 inconsistencies (i.e., rules) that did not rep-
resent vulnerabilities. Aside from the 20 rules that were caused by
easily fixed bugs in ACMiner, we resolve these non-security incon-
sistencies to their likely causes, and classify them into 9 categories,
shown in Table 3 ( RQ3).
H.1 Irregular Coding Practices
In addition to detecting vulnerabilities, ACMiner can also be useful
for detecting irregular coding practices in Android’s system services.
This may not only improve code quality, but may also help increase
computation speed, fix access bugs, or indicate locations of future
vulnerabilities, as described below.
1. Shortcuts to Speed-Up Access: As Table 3 shows, ACMiner
detected 7 inconsistencies that when fixed will improve the per-
formance of the system. For example, consider the BatteryStats-
Service. In this service, whenever an entry point checks for the
permission UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS, the entry point first calls enforc-
eCallingPermission, which contains an additional PID check that
grants the service quick access to its own entry point, bypassing
the permission check. This optimization speeds up access without
a significant security-cost. Now consider another entry point ta-
keUidSnapshots in the same service. ACMiner recommended this
same PID check to be included when other permissions in the ser-
vice BATTERY_STATS permission is checked for this entry point, i.e.,
ensuring the consistent application of such valuable short cuts.
2. Fixing Access Bugs: ACMiner detected 2 inconsistencies that
when fixed solve access-related bugs, i.e., discrepancies in how a
permission should be used (i.e., as per the documentation). For
example, consider the entry point getUserCreationTime of the User-
ManagerService. The entry point is currently limited to being called
by either the same user as the user indicated by the userId passed
in as an argument or a parent of user. However, other similar entry
points in the service also grant access to callers with the signature
level permission MANAGE_USERS. Thus, ACMiner recommends the
addition of the MANAGE_USERS permission check to this entry point.
This is consistent with the documentation, which states that callers
with the MANAGE_USERS permission may call getUserCreationTime.
3. Potential Vulnerabilities: ACMiner detected 16 inconsisten-
cies which may lead to future vulnerabilities. Consider the entry
point deletePackage in the PackageManagerService, which checks
for the permission INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL when verifying if
the calling user can operate on the user represented by the userId
argument. Almost all the entry points in the service use the au-
thorization check enforceCrossUserPermission to perform a similar
user-related authorization check. That is, deletePackage still per-
forms the hard-coded permission check, and is inconsistent with the
majority that call the modular enforceCrossUserPermission permis-
sion check. Thus, there is as strong possibility that the hard-coded
check in deletePackage may be overlooked when additional user-
related enforcement is introduced, resulting in a vulnerability.
H.2 Improvements to ACMiner’s Accuracy
Our systematic investigation of ACMiner’s results leads to 6 causes
of non-security rules that motivate future work:
1. Difference in Functionality: A majority of the non-security
inconsistencies (i.e., 189) were caused in cases where the target and
supporting entry points contained unrelated protected operations,
and thus, comparing their authorization checks resulted in unusable
association rules. We are exploring techniques such as call graph
comparison and method-name comparison to improve entry point
groupings to mitigate such rules.
2. Checks With Different Arguments: We observed 66 non-
security inconsistencies where same authorization checks were
instantiated in code with slightly different arguments, without af-
fecting the security context. This problem may be mitigated by
making ACMiner’s analysis more precise, i.e., by analyzing consis-
tency in terms of the relevant arguments and variables that actually
affect the security context of the authorization check. Such fine-
grained analysis is a non-trivial problem for future work.
3. Noise in Captured Checks:Despite the use of the control pred-
icate filter, ACMiner still identifies some conditional statements and
method calls improperly as authorization checks. We have already
determined the statements causing this issue, and are addressing
it via a routine refinement of the control predicate filter as well as
the expressions used to identify context queries.
4. Restricted to Special Callers:We found that numerous entry
points in the system are restricted to being called by special callers
(e.g., the UID of system, shell, or root). As a result, any association
rules generated for such entry points are valueless since the target
entry point is more restrictive than the supporting entry points.
We are exploring the integration of a unified view of the hierarchy
among the different authorization checks in ACMiner (i.e., in terms
of which checks supersede others) to mitigate such issues.
5. Semantic Groups of Checks: We observed that a number of
unrelated permission checks are always accompanied by checks
for the system or root UID or isolated processes. Thus, ACMiner
ends up generating rules using the UIDs/isolated process checks as
supporting authorization checks, recommending unrelated permis-
sions as the missing authorization checks. That is, since ACMiner
does not consider such semantic groups, it generates multiple in-
correct rules in cases where a few entry points check for different,
unrelated, permissions, while also checking for UIDs/isolated pro-
cesses. From our analysis of the results, we have discovered that
such rules can be filtered out as the generally follow a pattern.
6. Equivalent Checks: ACMiner does not consider the semantic
equivalence between authorization checks, and thus, cannot elimi-
nate association rules generated due to multiple checks having the
same outcome. Fortunately, we have discovered numerous sets of
equivalent checks through this analysis, which we plan to apply to
ACMiner to improve its accuracy.
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